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Introduction 
The economic transformation process in Central European Countries (CEC)
1 has 
profoundly affected public finance. The process of reforming public finance (covering both 
tax and expenditure reforms) is a long lasting one with specific features in individual 
countries. This makes a comparison over relatively short time periods difficult.   
Nevertheless, some common, general features to the restructuring of CEC public finances 
can be identified.  
There were at least three main aspects of the inherited tax systems which required 
urgent reform to facilitate the transition to a market economy:  
1.  the need to establish a system of parametric profit taxation that would eliminate the 
"soft budget constraints" and support incentive driven forces in the economy;  
2.  the necessity to achieve universal and equal tax treatment of different sectors, 
commodities, and forms of ownership to ensure that resource allocation would be 
driven by undistorted market forces; and  
3.  adequate adjustment of individual income taxation in line with the distributional 
objectives and the institutional changes.  
The initial state of each individual CEC tax system has determined the depth and pace 
of reforms. The fundamental tax reform experienced in each CEC country has closely 
followed Western European practices with  all elements similar in design to the taxes 
operating in EU economies. The  main revenue workhorses of the CEC systems are VAT 
and consumer taxes (excise duties), corporate and individual income tax, and the payroll-
based social security contributions. The systems are accompanied by property taxes and 
some other taxes of minor significance. 
In general, after CEC countries overcame the initial macroeconomic stabilization 
period, the effort to restore fiscal potential was linked with the economic revival and overall  
tax reform. These efforts coincided with the advancements  in public expenditure
2 reforms.  
The  result was that CEC spending patterns converged towards the spending patterns of EU 
countries with mature social welfare systems. Expenditure developments were characterized 
by high spending ratios resulting in budget deficits (the Czech Republic (CR) being the only 
exception), leading to conflicting taxation and expenditure policy targets. The high taxation 
levels in the CEC can be viewed as counterproductive both for the desired level of 
economic growth, and when taking into account the international experience, for the 
improvement of tax compliance and the capacity to  collect tax revenue . 
Regarding this point, fiscal capacity seemed to be crucial in an explicit or implicit 
ranking of CEC tax reform priorities. The relevant goals of tax reform can be briefly 
described as follows: 
                                                           
1 This paper covers the 4 Vyshegrad Group countries, i.e., the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia. 
2 See M. Dabrovski: Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period, Studies & Analyses No. 72, Warsaw, 1996 Comparison of  the Tax Structure in Central European... 
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•  ensure sufficient fiscal capacity to enable the development of sound public finance; 
•  design consumption taxes to be the main revenue workhorse; 
•  implement the social security contributions that will ensure the future fiscal autonomy of 
the social systems; 
•  implement universal income taxation which would unify the taxation of different sources 
of  income into a single tax;  and 
•  open the process of tax harmonization with the  tax systems of OECD countries, and 
especially that of EU. 
Based on comparison with the EU countries, this paper addresses two issues:  
•  the overall tax burden and the tax structure (measured by the tax ratios) generated by the 
CEC reformed tax systems; and 
•  the corresponding statutory and economic  incidence of the tax structure both on the 
source and use side measured by average and marginal tax rates. 
Using the neoclassical assumption that the effective tax rate affects level of savings, 
investment, labor supply and to the rate of unemployment, the analyses will be based on the 
calculations of the effective tax rates as parameters  affecting economic decision on 
aggregate level  (where the data are available) or as parameters affecting the economic 
behavior of „the typical worker and its employer“.  
As further harmonization of tax policies becomes increasingly important for economic 
integration of CEC with the European single market, the tax patterns of EU Member State 
Countries and effective rates of main  taxes and the resulting tax wedge corresponding to 
EU patterns are used as a „norm“ for evaluating the CEC tax policies. 
The length of the observed period and the data pattern differs according to the 
availability of the individual  CEC data.    
1. Development of Tax Ratios 
The previously described goals of tax reforms, in conjunction with restrictions on the 
state's role in the economy, have determined the initial level of CEC tax burdens and their 
structure. The resulting fiscal yield and tax structure are outcomes of the actual tax 
legislation, tax administration efficiency, and macroeconomic performance. To eliminate 
the impact of economic performance (economic cycle and inflation) on the level and 
structure of the tax burden, the tax burden (i.e., the tax ratio)  is measured by the ratio of 
overall tax revenue
3 to GDP.  
                                                           
3 The overall tax revenue are measured in accordance with OECD methodology as the sum of taxes, charges 
and tariff duties collected by the fiscal authorities in the calendar year expanded by the social security 
contributions, inc. mandatory pension, sick leave, unemployment and health insurance. D. Vaskova 
CASE Foundation  6
The tax burden and its structural developments in CEC and EU
4 countries are listed in 
Table 1.   
Table 1: Tax Ratios in CEC and EU Countries (in % of GDP) 
   of  which 
Country Tax 
ratio 
Income tax to GDP ratio  Social 
contributions  
Consumption tax 
to GDP ratio  









1 48.1  12.2  4.3 7.9 18.3 16.3
CR 1994  47.2  11.7  5.3 6.4 18.9 15.9
CR 1995  45.8  11.3  5.7 5.6 18.7 15.2
Hungary 1993  42.0  9.6  7.1 1.7 14.9 16.5
Hungary 1994  41.0  9.3  6.5 1.9 14.1 16.5
Poland   1993  43.9  13.5  9.2 4.3 13.8 14.5
Poland   1994  42.6  13.3  9.8 3.4 12.1 15.4
Part B** 
Portugal 31.4  8.6  6.2 2.4 8.4 13.4
United Kingdom   33.6  11.8  9.4 2.4 6.0 11.9
Spain 35.1  10.5  8.4 2.1 13.4 9.4
Ireland 36.3  14.6  11.6 3.0 5.6 13.9
Germany 39.0  12.0  10.6 1.4 15.1 10.9
Greece 41.2  7.5  3.8 3.7 13.9 18.1
Austria 43.6  11.8  9.5    2.3 14.8 12.8
France 43.9  7.6  6.1 1.5 19.6 11.7
Luxembourg 44.6  16.4  9.2 7.2 12.7 12.0
Belgium 45.7  16.2  13.8 2.4 16.3 12.0
Finland 45.7  17.5  16.3 1.2 12.1 14.7
Italy 47.8  16.2  11.9 4.3 17.7 11.3
Netherlands 48.0 15.5 12.2 3.3 18.3 12.1
Denmark 49.9  29.7  26.0 3.7 1.6 15.9
Sweden 49.9  20.6  18.4 2.2 13.8 13.7
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, MF, and own calculations. 
Notes: Tax ratio includes income taxes (1000), social security contributions (incl. health 
insurance)  (2000), payroll taxes(3000), property taxes (4000), taxes on goods and services 
(5000) and other(6000). 
  Data for Slovakia are not available.  
  1. The CR data for 1993 are influenced by the 1992 taxes "paid from the previous tax 
system" and   collected in 1993 
2. Data for 1993. 
The CEC tax ratios were just at or above the EU average in 1993, and correspond with 
ratios of high spending EU countries. The highest tax country among the CEC was the CR 
at 48.1%, well above the EU average and comparable with Netherlands, Denmark and 
Sweden, i.e., with the countries with the mature welfare state systems. This is rather  an 
outcome of a different fiscal policy goal as the CR has had a balanced budget policy over 
the whole of the observed period than an outcome of social system transformation.  The 
                                                           
4 The data for the EU countries includes only 1993. We do not expect the EU tax ratios to vary significantly 
in following years. Comparison of  the Tax Structure in Central European... 
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balanced budget policy  resulted in fiscal surpluses
5 in CR in comparison with the budgetary 
deficits
6 experienced by other CEC countries. 
Due to the decline in the tax/GDP ratio in following  year by 0.5 - 1 percentage point, 
the CEC tax ratio has just narrowed (and in the case of Hungary, eliminated) the gap 
between CEC and average of EU countries. 
As a result of continuing tax adjustments, the CEC tax patterns have been restructured 
in line with those of EU countries. However, the tax patterns in  individual CEC countries 
are not uniform. The main revenue  workhorse in Hungary became consumption taxes at 
16.5%, as measured by the ratio of consumption tax revenue to GDP.  This was followed by 
the CR at 16.3% and Poland with 14.5% (the EU average is 12.9%). Social security 
contributions are the main revenue source in the CR at 18.3% (compared with the EU 
average ratio of 12.6%), followed by Hungary (14.9%) and Poland (13.8%) in 1993.  
The significance of income taxes decreased in each of the compared CEC countries, 
but by far the greatest in Hungary. Income taxation in Hungary is comparable with the three 
lowest taxing EU countries (France, Portugal, and Greece). This is due to taxing corporate 
income at an extremely low statutory rate (listed below). The income tax ratio in Poland 
(13.5%) is near the EU average level (14.4%).   The ratio is below the EU average  in the 
CR  (12.2%) and is also presumably below average in Slovakia
7 in 1993, declining slowly 
in consequent periods. 
2. Consumption Taxation 
 Taxation on consumption is made up of the VAT, specific consumption taxes 
(excises), and tariff duties. The main workhorse of consumption taxation is the Value 
Added Tax based on the destination principle, which has been in force from 1989 in 
Hungary,  and from 1993 in the rest of the CEC. In addition to designing a robust fiscal 
channel, the main goal of implementing VAT was to improve the overall regressivity of 
consumption taxation by expanding the tax base to include services and enhance its   
neutrality by reducing the range of rates in comparison with the "old" system. VAT was 
expected to reduce tax evasion by collecting revenue on each stage of production and to 
gain an advantage from its applicability to actual transaction value. On the other hand, to 
process and enforce the VAT regulations imposes substantial demands on administrative 
resources. For example, the number of  taxpayers to be monitored and controlled increased 
enormously. These administrative resources, at least at the initial stages of VAT 
implementation, were not available. 
                                                           
5 General Government Statistics reports the +26.6 bill CZK (or 2.9% of GDP) in 1993 and + 9.3 bill CZK 
(0.1% GDP) in 1994 in CR.  
6 See U. Kosterna: The State of public Finances in Post-socialist, Central European Economies - a 
comparison with the European Union countries, CASE, 1996. The Government Balances are figured  in 1993 
and 1994 as follows: Hungary -8.0,-6.5, Poland -2.3, -2.9. 
7 After the split of the former Czechoslovakia, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia have adopted nearly 
identical tax systems which originated in the federal draft of the tax reform with only slight difference in 
statutory provisions. D. Vaskova 
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In  the CR, Poland, and Slovakia, VAT was put into effect at the beginning of the 
observed period  while in Hungary it was put into place earlier.  In the first group, as a once-
only price increase was expected followed by a demand shock after the implementation of 
VAT,  the tax was designed with relatively broad range of commodities taxed at the reduced 
rate. 
For example in the CR and Slovakia, commodities originally taxed at a 0% turnover 
tax rate, including all basic foodstuffs, services, energy, coal, construction, and other 
activities, are still taxed at the reduced rate. The situation in Poland is similar. These 
policies aimed to reduce the social cost and demand pressure. But, they also eroded the 
principle of neutrality and have only postponed the final solution. This is especially the case 
in energy where the low taxation is distorting the energy market, supporting energy 
intensive production, and the substitution effect from lower taxation is resulting in an 
ecologically unfavorable structure of energy consumption. 
In comparison with the EU where the range of rates applied by Member state countries 
has fallen remarkably since 1987, the VAT standard rates (see Table 2) are on or near the 
expected upper  level of 25% recently applied in Denmark and Sweden only. The reduced 
VAT rate is on the bottom EU level of 5% in the CR. In Hungary there is remarkable 
tendency to raise the reduced VAT rate  without lowering the standard one. 
Hungary has experienced similar problem as described above. The original reduced 
rate of 15% was accompanied by the 0% rate for some foods, pharmaceuticals, and public 
transport. In 1993, the government launched a large scale revision which lowered the 
reduced rate to 6% (from August 1993 10%), but the 0% rate remained for some products; it 
was followed by an reduced rate increase to 12% rate in 1995 with some products 
previously in reduced rate category were reclassified and taxed at the standard rate (e.g. 
telecommunication services, household energy). The higher reduced rate of 12.5% is 
applied in Ireland only. 
Table 2.1: VAT Rates in CEC  
Country 1993  1994  1995 
VAT  rates  Reduced Standard  Reduced  Standard Reduced Standard 
CR 5 23  5 23 5 22 
Hungary 0.6 25  0.10 25 12 25 
Poland 7 22  7 22 7 22 
Slovakia 5 23  6 25 6 25 
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Table 2.2: Tax rates in EU Countries (in 1996) 
Country VAT  rate 
















Table 3: Effective Consumption Tax Rates* (in %) 
Country 1990  1993  1994  1995 
Spain 12,7  12.8 - - 
Italy 15.5  14.9 - - 
Germany 15.8  16.5 - - 
United Kingdom  16.4  16.6 - - 
Belgium 16.8  16.8 - - 
Netherlands 18.5  18.1 - - 
France 20.4  18.4 - - 
Portugal 18.5  19.5 - - 
Greece 17,9  20.3 - - 
Austria 22.2  21.7 - - 
Sweden 26.1  24.2 - - 
Ireland 26.8  25.2 - - 
Finland 30.5  26.5 - - 
Denmark 34.3  31.9 - - 
CR** -  21.7 21.4 21.2 
Source: OECD National Accounts, OECD Revenue Statistics, Czech Statistical Office, and own 
calculations. (the data for the Poland, Hungary and Slovakia are not available.) 
  1 . Calculated as the ratio of indirect tax on goods and services (VAT + selective consumption taxes) 
divided by pretax aggregate private and nonwage public consumption (private consumption + 
government consumption - wages and salaries paid by government + social security contributions paid 
by government as an employer)   
  2. CR data are preliminary. 
On the other hand, the CR experience from the 1994 reduction in the standard VAT 
rate by 1 percentage point indicates that a small decrease in the VAT rate odes not result in 
a price reduction being offset by higher profits, with no visible demand effects. 
 D. Vaskova 
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3. Income  Taxation 
 As was shown above, the CEC have adopted policies to shift the tax burden from 
income to consumption  taxation which coincided with the policy of separating the revenue 
from payroll-based social security contributions. It has led to tax structures similar in design 
to those of the EU countries. However, there are some departures from this pattern (see 
Table 1). 
The income tax ratios in Hungary and Poland have a similar structure to EU countries 
with individual income ratio overweighing that of corporate income. In CR and Slovakia the  
corporate income tax ratio is higher than that of individual income tax. Although the ratio of 
corporate income tax to GDP in the CR is declining, from 7.9% in 1993 to 6.4% in 1994, it 
is still nearly double of that in Poland and nearly a 3.5-multiple of that in Hungary. In 
comparison with EU countries, the Czech corporate income tax ratio corresponds to a 2.2 
multiple of 1993 EU average and individual income tax is nearly 2.6 times higher than in 
EU. 
 
3.1 Labor Income Taxation 
The reformed taxation of labor income has two elements: 
•  individual income tax levied at the sources of income for individuals and 
unincorporated businesses for which the labor income is the main one; 
•  payroll-based social security contributions assign to finance the insurance funds. 
The pattern of individual income tax differs among the CEC, making comparison 
difficult. In general, individual income tax in the CEC is a mixture of a  comprehensive 
income taxation and  an expenditure type of income taxation.  
The income tax base  covers earned income including income in-kind, self-employed 
income, sale from immovable assets, capital gains (with special arrangements), other capital 
income as from interest, dividends and other securities taxed by withholding tax. Given 
these similarities, there are many differences, for example: 
•  in general, the CR and the SR have adopted a system with a wide range of standard 
deductibles, the Polish and Hungarian system is based on the 0 bracket with range of 
non standard deduction and nonrefundable tax credit in Poland, and tax relief for 
children in Hungary; 
•  pensions from domestic mandatory pension insurance  are exempt  in the CR and SR,  
a tax credit is provided to pensioners in Hungary; 
•  social security contributions are deductible from the statutory base in the CR and SR, 
and are not deductible in Hungary, and are rated at  0% in Poland; 
•  there are limited work-related deductions in Poland and SR;  Comparison of  the Tax Structure in Central European... 
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•  tax credit on housing savings is provided in Hungary. In Poland, tax relieves are 
provided on new land for houses, renovation of housing estates in Poland; 
•  an individual can opt out of joint taxation in Poland, calculating tax liability from half 
of the joint taxable income using the tax schedule and then this amount is doubled. 
All CEC countries have adopted an individual income tax system with the progressive 
structure of marginal rates. In 1994, the top marginal rate varied from 41% in CR to 45% in 
Poland.  
Tables 4: Description of the main parameters of Individual Income Taxation in CEC 
Table 4.1: The Czech Republic 
Deductibles (in CZK):  1993  1994  1995 
general allowance  20 400 21 600  24 000
child allowance  9 000 10 800  12 000
spouse allowance  12 000 12 000  12 000
health allowance  12 000 12 000  12 000
student allowance  6 000 6 000  6 000
travel allowance  2 400  
Tax rates in 1993 - 1995 
Taxable income (in CZK)  Marginal rate 
to 60 000  15 %
60 000 - 120 000  20 %
120 000 - 180 000  25 %
180 000 - 540 000  32 %
540 000 - 1 080 000  40 %
1 080 000 and more  47 %*
* The tax rate has been lowered regularly in the highest tax bracket: in 1994 it was 44%, 
and in 1995 it was 43 % D. Vaskova 
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Table 4.2: Hungary 
1992 - 1993  1994 - 1995 
Taxable income in HUF  Marginal 
tax rate 
Taxable income in HUF  Marginal 
tax rate 
             - 100 000 0%                     - 110 000 0%
100 000 - 200 000  25%  110 000 - 150 000 20%
200 000 - 500 000  35%  150 000 - 220 000 25%
     500 000 - and more 40%  220 000 - 380 000 35%
    380 000 - 550 000 40%
           550 000 and more 44%
Table 4.3: Poland 
1993 1994 








          -    4 320 0%            -    4 320 0%
4 320  -  64 800  20%  4 320  -  90 800  21%
64 800 - 129 600 30%  90 800 - 181 600 33%
     129 000 and more 40%       181 600 and more 45%
 Comparison of  the Tax Structure in Central European... 
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 Table 4.4: Slovakia 
Deductibles (in CSK)  1993  1994 
general allowance:  20 400 21 000 
child allowance:  9 000 9 000* 
spouse allowance:  12 000 12 000 
health allowance:  12 000 12 000 
work-related expenses:  2 400 3 600 
Tax rates in 1993 - 1994 
Taxable income (in CSK)  Marginal rate: 
to 60 000  15 %
60 000 - 120 000  20 %
120 000 - 180 000  25 %
180 000 - 540 000  32 %
540 000 - 1 080 000  40 %
1 080 000 and more  47 %**
* 18 000 CSK for disabled children 
** The top rate was reduced to 42 % in 1994 
All CEC countries have introduced mandatory social security contributions. These  
cover pension, sickness, unemployment, and health insurance in the CR and SR; pension, 
sickness, and unemployment insurance in Hungary; and pension and unemployment 
insurance in Poland. The 1993 (and following years in CR) rates for employees and 
employers are listed in Table 5. 
The social security rates are flat in all CEC varying  
•  for employees from 0% in Poland, 11% in Hungary (the  rates remained unchanged 
since 1992)  to 13.5% in CR and Slovakia (with a reduction of 0.25 percentage point 
in CR in 1994); these rates (with exception of Poland) are about average EU level;  
•  for employers from 36% in CR to 48% in Poland; these rates shifting the social cost to 
employers are comparable with the Italy (46%) only, otherwise being well above EU 
level. 
 D. Vaskova 
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Total average tax 
rate*** 













Hungary 1992  15.5 (10.8) 11.0  47.0 26.5 50.0 25  36 71.6
Poland  1993   17.2 (15.3) 0.0  48.0 17.2 44.1 20  20 64.7
Slovakia 1993  7.8 (0.6) 12.0  38.0 19.8 42.4 15   27.0 62.5
Slovakia 1994  8.3 (2.2) 12.0  38.0 20.3 42.6 15  27.0 62.7
Slovakia 1995  8.9 (3.7) 12.0  38.0 20.9 42.8 15  27.0 63.0
CR 1993  8.2 (1.9) 13.5  36.0 22.0 41.9 15   28.5 62.3
CR 1994  9.1 (3.1) 13.25  35.25 22.6 42.2 15   28.25 62.1
CR 1995  9.4 (3.8) 13.25  35.25 22.9 42.7 20   33.25  61.8
Notes: see Table 5.2 Comparison of  the Tax Structure in Central European... 
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Table 5.2: Taxation of an Average Production Workers's* Labor Income in EU 
Countries 





Total average tax rate  Tax wedge 
 Employee  Employer    Employee
1 Effective
2  
Belgium 13.1 34.2  24.1  (11.9) 37.2 53.2  67.0
Denmark 2.6 0  44.1  (36.2) 47.0 47.0  56.7
Finland 7.1 3.8  28.6  (23.3) 35.7 38.1  47.9
France  18.4 n.a.   8.5 (1.7) 26.9 n.a.  n.a.
Ireland 8.8 12.2  23.6  (15.7) 32.3 39.7  50.1
Italy 10.0 46.0  16.5  (12.9) 26.5 49,6  69.1
Luxembourg 12.5 14.9  12.7  (n.a.) 25.2 34.9  44.9
Germany 18.3 18.3  18.3  (7.9) 36.6 46.4  55.0
Netherlands 29.3 7.2  12.2  (9.5) 41.5 45.4  51.7
Portugal 11.0 24.5  6.4  (1.9) 17.4 33.7  48.0
Austria 17.5 23.6  8.9  (3.3) 26.4 40.5  55.3
Greece 15.8 27.4  1.7  (0.5) 17.5 35.3  52.7
Spain 6.1 31.6  12.3  (5.9) 18.4 38.0  52.5
Sweden 1.0 29.8  28.5  (28.5) 29.5 45.6  60.4
United 
Kingdom 
7.6 10.4 18.0  (15.0) 25.6 32.6  42.8
Source: The tax/benefit position of production workers, OECD 1990 - 1993,  and own 
calculations.  
Notes: 
* Average wage of full time production workers in the manufacturing sector (15- 33% of 
all employees). 
** In accordance with OECD methodology, the social security contribution includes 
heath insurance. 
*** Average rate of income tax paid by a single worker without children; the rate for a 
single-earner couple with two children is figured in the brackets. 
1) Calculated as the  sum of the social security and  the effective average income tax  
rates for gross earned income. 
2) Calculated as the ratio of ( income tax +  social security contributions paid by 
employees and employers) divided by ( gross earnings  +  social security contributions 
paid by employers). 
3) Calculated as the sum of marginal income tax rate and the social security rate 
4) The tax wedge of a  unit of income devoted to consumption before and after taxation is 
calculated as (1-(1-sstax)(1-inctax)/(1+vatax)); where sstax is the rate of social security 
contributions paid by employee and employer, inctax is the average rate of individual 
income tax  and vatax is the standard VAT rate 
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Effective Tax Rates on Labor Income 
Because of the limited availability of National Account data, the aggregate approach 
can not be used for computing the effective tax  rates on labor income. Alternatively we use 
the point approach analyzing the tax impact on the behavior of a typical economic agent 
represented by the average industrial worker and his employer. The group of industrial 
workers represents 15 - 33% of employees in all activities in the compared countries. The 
results are to be interpreted with this limitation kept in mind. On the other hand, the average 
production worker wages are below the average wage of employees in all activities, causing 
the indicators to be underestimated.  
To compute the  average rates we opted for an approach more rigorous than the tax 
law treatment; i.e., we based our calculations on tax payments which do not reflect the non-
standard reliefs determined by reference to the actual expenses occurred by a "typical" 
worker. This concept does not conform with the macroeconomic concept of effective tax 
rates, but can provide a useful approximation of aggregate rates.  
The effective average tax rate approach provides  a parameter affecting the generated 
tax revenue. The effective marginal rate are relevant for the supply and demand of  labor 
and the tax structure progressivity and for the consumption/saving decision. These rates are 
useful approximation of to the taxes that distort economic decisions taking into account the 
effective tax burden resulting from each of the major taxes. 
 
  The average income tax rates (calculated as the tax to gross income rate) has varied 
from 17.2% (or 15.3) in Poland to 7.8% (or 0.6%) in Slovakia in the initial year and has 
grown during the observed period.  
 The change in taxes  is an outcome of the  growth of nominal wages and the 
progresivity of taxation. In general, none of CEC have adopted the automatic indexation of 
taxes to inflation. From the above description of the statutory provisions, it is evident that 
individual countries cope with inflation differently
8. From the described relatively short 
period, it seems that the governments in CR and Hungary discretionary responded in an 
attempt to cope with the inflationary fiscal drag. The Czech government relies more on 
allowance-induced subsidies along the income scale than on bracket indexation, while the 
Hungarian government opted out of the latter approach with the lowering the marginal rates. 
The tax payers' protection against inflation was weaker in Poland and Slovakia.  
                                                           
8 According to M. Dabrowski, op. cit., the CPI were in CEC as follows:    
Country: 1993  1994  1995 
Czech Republic  20.8  10.2    9.0 
Hungary 22.5  19.0  29.0 
Poland 35.2  33.2  29.0 
Slovakia 23.0  14.0  10.0 
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From the CPI and individual income tax ratio  developments we can assume that the 
average tax rate increase by 1.2 percentage points in the CR between 1993 - 1995  was 
mainly due to real wage growth with stable progressivity along the income scale (causing 
the individual tax-GDP ratio increase by 1.4 percentage points).  In Hungary the individual 
tax-GDP ratio has fallen by 0.6 percentage point in 1994. From available information, the 
effective average labor income tax rate increase in Slovakia (1.1 percentage point from 1993 
- 1995) was due to a very pure income tax adjustment to inflation. 
The dispersion of marginal income tax rate for the "typical worker"  is from 25% or 
20% (corresponding to the second tax bracket in Hungary in 1992 and Poland in 1993) to 
15% in relationship to the first tax bracket in the remaining CEC in 1993 (a shift to second 
bracket in the CR in 1995).  
When comparing the average tax rate of income tax with EU countries, the CR and 
Slovakia fall into rank of light taxing countries, the Poland and Hungary into middle group. 
In considering take-home pay, not only the income tax is relevant, but also the payroll 
based contributions paid by employees. For the average productive worker  the social 
security contributions borne by employees creates a greater burden in that the income tax in 
SR and in CR to 1994 making governments' efforts to compensate for inflation very 
difficult. The total burden beard  paid by employees measured by total average tax rate  
varied from 26.5% in Hungary to 17.2% in Poland, still comparable with the lower taxing 
EU countries. 
To identify the labor income tax burden on the source and use side, we use the 
effective labor income rates combining the average tax rate with the social security 
contributions paid both by employees and employers, i.e., the rate which measures unit  tax 
burden to full cost of labor. 
Using the concept of effective average tax rate, these rates varied from 50% in 
Hungary, 44.1% in Poland, and down to 41.9% in both Slovakia and in the CR in 1993 with 
a slight tendency to grow in later years. All the CEC can classified as heavy labor taxing 
countries. Countries within the EU taxing at similar effective average tax rate are Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany and Italy. Out of these, only Belgium is above Hungary. 
To measure the overall primary impact of taxation of labor and consumption we used 
the "tax wedge" indicator, referring to the difference between one unit of income devoted to 
consumption before and after taxation. Not having data on the structure of the VAT base for 
individual countries needed to calculate the weighted average VAT rate, we used the 
standard rate which overestimates the impact of consumption taxation. This factor is more 
important for the CEC as the range of commodities taxed by the reduced rate is broader here 
and the tax base is defined more narrowly than in the EU. This is why the results are 
overestimated and are  to be interpreted very carefully. 
The results indicated that the most heavily taxing countries in the EU are Italy and 
Belgium. Hungary is approximately 2.5 or 4.6 percentage points above them. The tax wedge 
has a slight tendency to raise in Slovakia from 62.5% in 1993 to 63% in 1995 and the slight 
tendency to fall in the CR from 62.3 in 1993 to 61.8 in 1995, landing near Sweden (the third D. Vaskova 
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heaviest tax wedge within EU  at 60.4% in 1993) other EU countries were, on average, 
under this level by 15 percentage points. 
  
III. 2 Taxation on Profits 
Two reasons are commonly given for taxing profits. One is simply that corporate 
profits are a convenient point at which to tax the income of company owners. Profits are just 
therefore an administrative feature of the tax system which avoids the need for all 
shareholders to declare their dividends. This problem can not be fully solved by a flat 
withholding tax which would not reflect the progressive income tax schedule. 
The other is that, in theory, a tax on profit can raise revenue at lower distortional cost; 
a profit tax does not distort incentives to invest as long as government only taxes in excess 
of those profits which a company must earn in order to satisfy its financiers. In practice, the 
corporate tax in CEC as well as EU countries do not tax pure profits, but some mixture of 
profits and income. 
This paper can not examine deviations from the pure profit tax base. It just needs to be 
mentioned that these deviations cause economic distortions and these distortions are worse 
in the presence of inflation as no corporate tax system can fully adjust for the effect of 
inflation. This is a primary problem in the CEC. 
In addition, the statutory corporate income tax rates are a very weak indicator of the 
intensity of taxation. 
CEC countries have commonly adopted the policy of reducing the statutory rates (only 
in Poland was the rate unchanged over the observed period), but the rates still  remaining at 
the top of the EU countries with just Italy being above. The most radical policy was adopted 
in Hungary, where the rate was reduced to 36% in 1994 and the reduced rate of 18% for 
retained profits and a surcharge of 23% for distributed profits was introduced in 1995. This 
rate is far lower than the lowest in the EU (25% in Finland). Comparison of  the Tax Structure in Central European... 
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Table 6: Corporate Income Tax Rates in CEC and EU 
Countries (in %) 
Country 1993  1994  1995  1996 
Belgium   39
Denmark   34
Finland   25
France   33.3
Ireland   40
Italy   52.2
Luxembourg   39.4
Germany   45/30
*
Netherlands   35
Portugal   39.6
Austria   34
Greece   40
Spain   35
Sweden   28
United Kingdom          33
CR   45  43 41  39
Hungary 40    36 18 18
Poland 40  40 40 40
Slovakia 45  40 40 40
* where two rates are given, the latter is the rate on retained profits 
 
III. 3 Taxation on Capital 
In addition to the corporate income tax, all the CEC have implemented a withholding 
tax on post-tax profits distributed to the company owners in the form of dividends. This tax 
has led to the economic double taxation of capital, which is more important in the countries 
which are lacking the capital for privatization and further development in the corporate 
sector. D. Vaskova 
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The combined effect of corporate income taxation and the withholding tax on 
dividends paid by the owner of capital can be measured as the difference between a unit of 
pre-tax profit devoted to distribution and its post-tax value. 
The profits which will be distributed are taxed at a much heavier rate than reinvested 
(retained) profits in all of the CEC. The average tax on distributed profits in Hungary is the 
lowest one, corresponding with the corporate income tax rate before its reduction to 18%. 
The average rate in the CR was reduced by providing a tax credit to corporations. Poland 
and Slovakia do not compensate either corporations or owners for double taxation. This is 
somewhat balanced by these countries providing some tax reliefs, eliminating the double 
taxation for some forms of savings (for such as pension insurance and housing savings). It 
soothes over some of the distortions on the financial markets, which would otherwise need 
government support. 
 
Table 7: CEC Taxation of Capital in 1995 (as %) 
Country  Rate of withholding 
tax on dividends 
Rate  of corporate 
income tax 
Average tax rate 
on distributed 
profits* 
CR 25 39** 47 
Hungary 23 18 36 
Poland 25 40 55 
Slovakia 25 40 55 
* Average tax rate on distributed profits  is calculated as 1- (1 - inctax)(1divtax), where 
inctax is corporate income tax rate and divtax is the rate of withholding tax on 
dividends 
 ** The tax credit of 50% on the  withholding tax on dividends for corporations was 
introduced in 1994 
 
Conclusions 
The fundamental tax reforms in the CEC resulted in the implementation of a tax 
structure similar in design to those operating in EU countries. This paper has confirmed the 
hypotheses that the reform was followed by  the adjustment of tax revenue patterns towards 
those of high spending countries. In general, in all of the CEC, the efforts to adjust the tax 
structure and reduce the tax ratio are conflicting with the need for social system funding. 
Even though within the CEC individual income taxation is low in the CR and Slovakia 
and quite mild in Hungary and Poland, these effects are overwhelmed by the burden of 
social security contributions. Taking them into account, labor  taxation corresponds to EU 
countries with mature welfare systems. The analyses indicates that the taxation on 
consumption is quite heavy too. The labor and consumption taxation creates a tax wedge Comparison of  the Tax Structure in Central European... 
CASE Foundation  21
much higher in the CEC than is the EU “norm“. This could be a strong barrier against fast 
development in the CEC, restricting the achievement of high economic growth rates which 
are desirable for the CEC's  economic integration into the EU. The CEC taxation of capital 
income from dividends, (with the exemption of Hungary), does not adequately integrate 
corporate and  individual taxation.  This is leading to the double taxation of some capital 
income,  creating distortions in the taxing of different forms of savings.  
On the other hand, significant departures by the individual tax policies within the CEC 
from EU “norm“ can be identified.  
  The policy pattern in CR is dominated by the balanced budget policy, causing the tax 
ratio to be the highest among the CEC.  In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where the tax 
structure was originally based on the taxation of the corporate sector, the tax structure is still 
biased towards  corporate income taxation. The corporate sector is somewhat compensated 
by the partial shifting of social security contributions from employers to employees.   
Overall, these are low in comparison to the rest of the CEC. The CR has shown a slight 
tendency towards increasing individual income taxation in 1994 - 1995. 
 In Hungary, taxation of corporate income is extremely low, even in a European 
context. This is being balanced by the extremely heavy taxation of labor income (both of 
employees and employers) and consumption. 
 In Poland, the paper has identified the highest individual tax ratio with the highest 
average labor income tax rate within the CEC.  This is  accompanied by the corporate sector 
bearing the full burden of funding the social  security system. D. Vaskova 
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